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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with taxation, profits of finns and welfare. More specificaIly 
it analyses the effeet of a lump sum tax 00 a noncompetitive market with free 
entry. The maio resutt is that there are relevant situations in which the tax 
increases the profits oí the incumbent firms. Unfortunately this goes with a 
reduction in consumer suplus (and in social welfare measured by consumer 
surplus, plus profits oí firms plus revenues oí the Government). But a way is 
suggested and sorne examples given in which that problem can he overcome. 
RESUMEN 
El artículo trata problemas relacionados con imposición, beneficios de las 
empresas y bienestar. Más específicamente, analiza el efecto de un impuesto 
de cuantía fija en un mercado no competitivo con libertad de entrada. El 
resulado más importante es que existen situaciones relevantes en las cuales el 
impuesto incrementa los beneficios de las empresas establecidas. 
Desgraciadamente este incremento va acompañado de una disminución del 
bienestar social; no obstante, se sugiere una vía, y se dan algunos ejemplos, 
a través de la cual dicho problema puede superarse. 
TAX AHALYSIS IN A LIMIT PRICING BODEL 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this paper is to anal.yse the effect of 
taxes on profits of firms in noncompetitive markets with free 
entry. We principally approach the case of a lump sum tax: on 
firms operating in a market where the technology is freely 
available and therefore all firms have the same cost structure 
and economies of scal.e (existence of a fixed cost that every firm 
which works in the market has to pay) are the only-barriers to 
entry. However, we extend the analysis to more complex cases 
combining the lump sum tax with a subsidy ~ 
To make the analysis simpl.er and the explanation 
clearer, we approach the problem using a linear model, although 
in the Appendix the results are generalised. 
The most important conclusion is that relevant 
situations exist in which the incumbent firms maximize profits 
lf they pay a lump sum tax. It implies that it ls possible to 
design ~ taxation system where the position of direct payers is 
d¡imaged 111". 
This paper has its precedents in Dixit (1979), omori 
0*!í~!;o~ eorchon and Marcos (1988). It retains the 
,it~a#~the. p~é~ention ol entry is a geod strategy. 
>lI\¡.~¡í/cónclusion ef the latter iB that under similar 
,will establish here, particularly the 
tbe best option for the incwobent firms 
and only one firm remains in the market 
ROlleVe/", as Ne .Ni II see. it ls acc~anied by a deerease in conruner surplus and ¡¡Dei' t Nel tare 
by pr:ofit¡¡ of tlrn1S plus consLDler surplus plus Goverrmen s'''''''ravit)· then 8 subs-'dy ',. ,~+ .... ---' 
••• t".o".",_ thls drewbeck .... -. 1.~ro ..... ~ ..... 
supplying the limit output* or the monopoly output (the largest 
of the two amounts). 
The plan of the paper is as follows. section II 
stablishes the model and gets the main resul.ts. section III 
carries out an extension introducin9 a subsidy and makes some 
suggestions for futher research. Finally an appendix generalises 
the main result of Section II. 
IL THE MODEL. 
As previously mentioned a linear model. with a single 
firm in the market wil.l be used in order to analyse the effect 
of the lump sum tax on its profits. 
We depart from the conclusion drawn by omori and Yarrow 
and Corchón and Marcos that preventing entry maximizes the 
profits ef the incumbent firm, and therefore it should produce 
a quantity equal to or greater than the limit output. 
Let's design the demand 
z a - p 
where z = y + x , y being the output of the incumbent firm and 
x that of the potentia1 entrant. 
The cost functions are equal for both 
e K + vy e K + vx 
(it is important to note that this kind of cost function implies 
the decrease of average cost which is a necessary condition for 
the conclusion of amori and Yarrow and Corchón and Marcos). 
* lhalimlt oulput is the central concept ofthie paper and it ls ttle leSBer ouput which preveros enlfy. we saythat an 
output (of the iocumbent firm) preveots antry If given thle output another firm canoot work in the maricet with positiva profllS. 
It is obvious, if the profit funt:lion is quasi-concava (whlch le a usual assumpUon), that tha limit output providas a grealer proflt 
!han any othar oulput whlch prevants anlfy (axcept if monopoly output ie largar !han limit output : in !hat case tha formar 
pravents enlfy and maxlml:las proflts). 
2 
max " (a-y)y-K-vy-T 
restricted te y '2: Y = a - v - 2..¡K+T .. 
T 2: O 
The Lagragian of the problem is 
. Let Z '" f(P) be tile demand function with z"'y+x, y being tile output of Uta Incumbent firm and x the outpul of 
potential entrant. 
!he cost function for Ute entrant is 
and lbe average cost 
C'(x) = C(x) I x 
ff y prevents entry should be 
fl(x+y) = psc'(x) 'r/x 
.
.• { ..~~¡~~iE:f~""~"'1iyl ¡rlv + Xl) = C'(x1) tilat TII tile smaller ythat prevente entryfor x'. We can call itthe limit OUtput r N'" exlsts tile correspondlng Timit outplrt'¡, .¡ .... and tila greatest of them say Y prevente entry 
'< y can not prevent enlfy Ifx = X Ifl(V + xl = C'(x:) 
x =.fK+"'l' 
arid 1he Ilmll output 
y = a - v - 2.fK+"'l' 
3 
L( y, T, Al.' ;"2' r, S) 
where r, s are slack variables. 
The first order conditions are 
aL / ay = a - v - 2y + 11 = O (1) 
aL I aT = -1 - l, iW I aT + l, = -1 + l, I ,¡ K+T + l, = o (2) 
(3) 
aL I a l, = T - s' = o (4) 
aL lar = -2l,r = o (5) 
aL I a s = -2l,s = o (6) 
condition (2) involves the impossibility of A, and 
1z simul taneously being zero. Therefore there are only three 
possible cases: 1) 11 = O : AZ > O : 2) 1, > O; 1z > O, 
and 3)11 >o,1z =o, 
1) O ,lz>O 
In this case condi tien ( 2) implies 1z 
conditions (6) and (4) lead us to 
s = T o 
4 
1 and then 
res 
p" 
" 
• 
and for condition (1) 
y' ~ (a-v) / 2 
which is the monopoly output. 
This is the case of b10ckaded entry in Bain's 
termino1ogy. The estab1ished firm maximizes profits without 
having to worry about a possib1e entrant. rt produces the 
monopo1y output that being greater than 1imit ouput* prevents 
entry. 
In this case a 1ump SUD! tax has the effect of reducing 
the profits of the firm by the same va1ue as the tax. Because 
1imit output is less than monopoly output, we have 
that i6 
(a-v) :2: a-v-2 'K 
--2- v~ 
a:s;v+4!K 
On the other hand, the profits of the firm are 
'11"* = (a-v)2 / 4 - K 
and then the feasibility of the industry needs 
a>v+2/K 
I )1 
Therefdte the scope for this case is 
5 
J, 
" 
v+ 2¡l{< a < v+ 4.[K 
2) 1, > O, 12 > o 
conditions (5) and (6) imply 
r =: s = O 
and (3) • (4) 
T = O, y=y: a - v- 2,¡K 
p=v+2,¡K it = 2 (a-v),¡K - 5K 
, greater than monopoly 
In th~ s case 11mi t output J..S , 
... f t On the other the output whlch maximlzes pro J.. s. 
output and it ls firm are at a maximum if T = O, lump 
hand, because profits o~ the 
sum tax diminishes profJ..ts. 
't' (1) says ( 1, > O ) Besides condJ.. J..on 
-1, = a - v -2y < O 
That is 
a - v - 2a + 2v + 4.¡K < O 
a>v+4.¡K 
And c.ondi tion (2) 
1 2 = 1 + 
(a-v-2y) 
,¡K 
> O 
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..jK + a - v - 2a + 2v + 4/R> O 
a<v+S{K 
Therefore the scope for this solution is 
v + 4.fK < a < v + sfK 
3} 1 1 > O , l2 = O 
conditions (5) and (3) lead us to 
r "" 0, y=y 
and (6) and (4) to 
s ~ O T ~ O 
on the other hand, removing 1, between (1) and (2) 
1
1 
= 2a - 2v - 4'¡X + T - a + V :::.¡x + T 
S'¡K + T = a - v 
. ;; 
we find T (a - v)' / 25 - K 
limit output 15 
1, 
price 
_ ~ (a-v)' y=a-v-2 K+~-K 
y"" ..!(a - v) 
5 
p::: (2a + 3v) 
5 
and profits 
'Jt = 1:.. (a -v) 2 - K 
5 
Finally condition T ~ O provides the scope where this 
case 16 relevant 
implies 
that i6 
T [(a-v)' / 25] - K ~ O 
> 25 K 
a>v+S.¡K 
Te summarise, if the demand 15 great enough 
(a > v + 5.[K) 
a lump sum tax can increase the profits of the firm • 
We must point out that any expanding industry will 
sooner or later fal! into this last case and therefore its 
theoretical relevanoe to have been shown. 
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A brief cemment en this result 
Problems with taxes arise because everybody wants to 
payas little as possible and fight against any increase but in 
this case the tax does not damage the people who pay it and the 
Government will encounter less oppQsition. 
For instance, if the Government burdens profits of 
luxury restaurants, hotels or casinos with a tax it may have to 
face powerful pressure. But with this kind of tax it does not 
attack their profits and therefore will come up against less 
opposition. 
The same applies for firms making sophisicated luxury 
cars, yachts or private planes. From another point of view this 
tax could be useful for those goods, the consumption of which the 
Government would like to reduce (Tobacco, alcohol, etc). 
Of course, there is no reason for the Government to 
increase the profits of firms. If so it can choose the size of 
the tax to maximise its revenues or simply leave profits at the 
same level as they were without tax. 
EFFECTS ON SOCIAL WELFARE 
Reducing the limit output it increases the price and this 
increase is the cause for the rise in profits. But unfortunately 
this change encompasses a diminishing in consumer surplus* 
great enough to reduce the social welfare measured by consumer 
surplus, plus profits of the firms plus revenues of Government. 
only if it burdens goods consumad by people whose surplus 
can be considered ~t significant for social welfare (such as, 
may be, those exa4hPles quoted previously) the latter is not 
',' 
negatively affected • 
• R Is easy to show lIlat in IIlIs linear model a tax, T , provldes a fall in lile soc/a1 surplus equal to 2T. 
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III. EXTENSION: A LUMP SUM TAX COMBINED WITH A SUBSIDY PER UNIT 
NOW, an attempt will be made to overcome some of the 
limitations of the previous analysis: If a subsidy par unit sold 
(or bought) is introduced it is found that social welfare can be 
improved. 
Following on with the linear model, if we combine the 
tax with a subsidy to the producers per unit sold (or 
equivalently to the consumers per unit bought) the social surplUS 
can be wri tten 
E = Ea + 1t + T - ey 
E= ~2 +ay_ y 2_vy_K_T+tyT_ty 
that is 
E Ca - v)y - y' / 2 - K 
If we maximize this express ion supposing that the 
monopoly output is less than limit output* and therefora that 
this one is the solution, the formal expresion of the problem is 
max E = Ca - v)y - y' / 2 - K 
restricted te 
y = y = a - v + t - 2'¡K + T 
* We must remember lIlat the case In which '\he monopoly output Is gleater Is not 01 Inteleat 10 our propposals. 
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T ~ o 
t ~ o 
The correspondent Lagrangian introducing slack 
variables ls 
and the first order conditions 
~~",a-v-y+11='O 
aL '" y _ (a-v+t-2'¡K+TI '" o 
aJ., 
aL = T _ X2 = o 
aJ., 
t - 8 2 = O 
11 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5 ) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8 ) 
Conditions (2) and (3) imply tqat any 11 cannot be positive, 
therefore 
o 
then for condition (1) 
y a - v 
and for condition (4) 
t '" 2'¡K+T 
so, we find the competitive solution which i5 what we 
could have expected. Profits 
1t = (a-v) (v-v) - K + 2'¡K+T (a-v) - T 
~ " [2 (a-v) - '¡K+'I'J '¡K+T 
are positive and greater than profits without taxes 
~ " 2 (a-v).fIé - SK 
except if T is unussually great. 
As the vaIue of social welfare 
12 
E ~ 1!2 (a-v)' - K • 
dees not depend on the vaIue of the tax (it only must verify the 
relation ship t '" 2"¡K+T we can select the latter te achieve 
another goal-
SOME SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
up to now we have considered only increasinq returns, but 
similar results can be achieved, for some particular situations, 
when the average cost curve 16 U-shaped. 
In that case, it depends on the siza of demand wether the 
prevention of entry ls the best option for the incumbent firm or 
not. If demand 16 narrow enough to make the entry deterrent 
profitable the tax system will provide the same outcome that in 
the preceding case, but even introducing only the lump sum tax 
social welfare can be improved, by allowing a better use of 
economies of scale~. 
Finally I it can be suggested that if there are several firms 
in the industry, the lump sum tax can reduce their number 
allowing a more effective application of economies of scale, and 
therefore improving social welfare. 
* We can remember that ttig social surplus withoul taxes was 
E'" 1/2 (a-v)2._3K 
- For instarlCe, it is easy te show that if we want to maximize the profits of fue firm the value of the faX has to be 
*** AA example of thia can be obtained from the author on request. 
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APPENDIX : THE EFFECT OF A LUMP SOM TAX ON THE PROFITS OF FIRMS 
IN THE GENERAL CASE 
NOW, we leave the linear model and approach the problem 
assuming that demand and average C?st functions are decreasing 
and twice differenciable and the profit function is quasi-
ooncave. 
To obtain the output and the tax which maximize the 
profits of the firm the problem to solve is, as we ~ave se~n 
before 
max u yf-' (y) - K - T -v(y) 
restricted to y ;::; y (T) 
T 2 O 
where r'(y) is the inverse demand function and v(y) the variable 
costs. 
The Lagranqian of the problem introducing slack 
variables can be written 
L ~ yf -, (y) - K - T - v(y) + 1, (y - y-r' ) + l. (T - s, ) 
and the first order conditions 
aL! ay f-' (y) + y ! f' - v 
, 
+ 1, = o (1) 
aL! aT -1 - 1, ay! aT + l. o (2) 
aL! ar -2r11 o (3) 
aL! as -2612 o (4 ) 
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o 
o 
Condition (2) implies that one restriction , 
15 active. Therefore, three possible cases may arise 
A
2 
> O; 2) Al > O, 1 2 > O; 3) 1 1 > O, 1 2 = o. 
1) A, o, 12 > o. 
conditions (4) and (6) imply 
T = S = O 
and condition (1) 
f"' (y) + y j f' = v' 
(5) 
(6) 
at least, 
1)"'1=0; 
marginal revenue equals to marginal cost, previde us with output 
y* which maximizes profits (the monopoly output). 
In thls case, the parameters of demand and costs are 
such that monopoly output is greater than or e'l1:lal to limit 
output ; i t is the case of blockaded entry in Bain f 6 terminology. 
Here the incumbent firm maximize profits without worryinq about 
potencial competitors. To burden it with a lump sum tax would 
neither modify output nor price, but would reduce the profits by 
the value of the tax. 
, 
2) 12 ~ o. 
-, 
Condition (4) and (6) imply 
T = S = O 
15 '~ 
and conditions (3) and (5) 
y y 
besides , condition (1) 
+ y j f' < v' 
implies that monopoly output i5 less than limit output*, which 
16 the solution. 
In thls case the tax would increase the limit price and 
possibly the profits. But the increase of profits would always 
be less than tax and therefore it ls not profitable tor the firmo 
3) 1 1 >0,12 =0. 
conditions (3) and (5) imply 
y=y 
and condition (1) that limit output i6 greater than monopoly 
output. 
In this case, the lump sum tax can increase the profits 
of the incumbent firmo Ne can obtain the best value of the tax 
removing 11 from equation (1) and (2). Then we get 
f-' [y(T») + [ y (T») j f' - v' - 1 j (dyjdT) = O 
and by solving it we obtain the value of T. 
Of course, whether or not the tax would inorease the 
profits of the firma, an.i whether this inorease would be 
• This can be easUy seen remembering the second order conditions. 
16 
meaningful is an empirical question. The model that we have 
presented is general enough to allow for any resulto However, we 
have seen some arguments in favour of the relevanoe of the third 
case 
17 ¡ 
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